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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

:
:

JAMES L. ROBISON,

Case No. 20050257-SC

:

Defendant/Respondent.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (5) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Court of Appeals reversed a felony conviction based upon a plea of 'guilty'
for two reasons set forth in their opinion. The first was that the taking of the guilty plea
by the defendant/respondent did not comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure in that there was no clear understanding as to the elements of the offense to
which the plea was taken; which was ISSUING A BAD CHECK. The second reason was
because the court determined that, based upon the record, that the charges against the
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defendant did not have a factual basis for the reason the check he had given for payment
of a truck was issued over ten (10) days after the truck was delivered and, since there was
no contemporaneous exchange of the check for the truck, there was no criminal violation
of the bad check law. The State contends the appellate court is in error for even
considering the bad check law requirements and that there reasoning requiring
contemporaneous exchange is flawed.
STANDARD OF REVD2W
The Court of Appeals had discretion to decide the issue based on the necessity to
enter a proper decision. See Kaiserman Assoc, Inc. v. Francis Town. 977 P.2d 462,
(Utah 1998). The issue presented to this court is the appellate court's abuse of discretion
What is the time frame considered by the Utah bad check law which makes it a
crime for a person to issue or pass a check for the purpose of obtaining property. This
issue concerns a question of statutory interpretation that this court reviews for
correctness. See State v. Lusk. 37 P.3d 1103 (2001 Utah 102).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This appeal requires interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505 and
application of Section 7, Article 1, the Constitution of Utah (due process of law) (West
2004) and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; attached as Addendum A, B
andC.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the time of this incident, the defendant was a state-licensed car dealer, fully
bonded, and in such capacity had a customer who was interested in purchasing a certain
popular GMC three-quarter ton pickup truck (R. 396:8). He contacted other dealers,
including Painter Motor Company, another state-licensed car dealer, and its representative
Randy Painter inquiring if they had the truck his customer was interested in available to
them, and if he could acquire such a truck. (R. 396:5-6)
Painter Motor, through its agents, agreed to conduct a search and soon found the
described truck. They then acquired the truck and brought it to their place of business in
Nephi, Juab County Utah. On or about September 1, 2001, Randy Painter, Painter Motor
Company agent, contacted the defendant and advised him that the truck he had inquired
about was available at their business in Nephi. He agreed to allow the defendant to come
to their place of business in Nephi and examine the truck. This the defendant did.
After examining the truck, the defendant indicated that he had initial interest in the
truck and requested Painter to allow him to obtain and take possession of the truck and
transport it to his customer in Utah County where his customer could examine the truck
and determine if he was interested. His commitment at that time was that, after he had
consulted with his customer, he would then contact Randy Painter to advise him of his
customer's decision. (R. 396:8)
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The defendant then transported the truck from Juab County to Utah County where
it was shown to the customer. The customer was interested in the truck and they agreed
upon a purchase price. At that point, the defendant then called Randy Painter and advised
him that the customer wanted to keep the truck. (R. 396:10) Painter agreed. The truck
was never returned to Painter, but remained with the customer.
The defendant and Randy Painter then agreed that there would be a certain
exchange of documents. The defendant and Randy Painter each understood that, since
the defendant was a licensed and bonded Utah car dealer, he had authority to complete a
sale to his customer and to complete the appropriate initiation of a title by the Utah State
Department of Motor Vehicles. (R. 396:13).
The defendant had delivered possession of the truck to his customer and the
customer paid for the truck and continued to maintain possession. The trial court has
ruled that, at that point, the customer became the owner of the truck as a good-faith
purchaser in the due course of business. (R. 50, 101, 183)
Subsequently, the defendant had some conversation with Randy Painter regarding
title to the truck and payment. Eventually, approximately two weeks after taking
possession of the truck, the defendant delivered to Painter Motor Company the check
upon which this action is based. The check was dishonored.
There were further conversations between the defendant and Painter Motor
Company and a second check was subsequently issued to Painter Motor Company. The
4

second check was also dishonored. Subsequently these criminal proceeding were
prosecuted.
One of the first issues addressed in the criminal proceedings was the ownership
and possession of the subject vehicle. (R. 16) The purchaser was represented by attorney
Robert J. Schumacher. Hearings were held and the court entered its ruling determining
that the owner of the vehicle was a good-faith purchaser, having paid for the vehicle and,
under Utah law, was the owner of the vehicle and, consequently, the attempts of the State
to prevent the purchaser from maintaining possession and securing a Utah state vehicle
title were quashed and denied. (R. 183)
Over the next year, several hearings were held in this matter, including preliminary
hearing and the hearing on the question of the purchaser and possessor's ownership of the
truck and there were negotiations regarding a resolution of this case. Those negotiations
concluded by the parties agreeing that the defendant would withdraw his plea of 'not
guilty', the State would dismiss some charges, and the defendant would enter a plea of
'no contest' to Count I - the Bad Check charge which is now before the court. The
defendant's attorney prepared a written statement in advance of the entry of the 'no
contest' plea and spent over two hours reviewing that statement with the defendant. (R.
398:1-6) The following day, the defendant and his attorney then appeared before the
District Court for entry of plea.
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At the plea hearing, counsel for the defendant explained to the court what the
parties contemplated, the entry of a plea of 'no contest' to Count I and indicated that a
plea statement had been prepared, which the defendant had initialed and was prepared to
proceed with. At this point, the prosecutor indicated that he had changed his mind; that
he would not accept a plea of 'no contest' but that he required a straight-up guilty plea (R.
398; 3-4).
The court, counsel for the parties, and the defendant then engaged in negotiations
in an attempt to resolve a difficult case by trying to conclude the plea agreement. That
difficulty is exhibited in part by the record on the conversation between the court,
counsel, and the defendant which is more fully set forth below: (R. 398:3-20)
Page 3, line 7

G. WEIGHT:

I have prepared a statement of defendant
in support of a no contest plea to issuing
a bad check.

Page 3, line 16

D. LEAVITT:

We said that in exchange for the no
contest it would be theft by deception.

Page 4, line 8

D. LEAVITT:

Well, he can take his pick. He can have
guilty to the bad check or no contest to a
theft by deception.

Page 4, line 14

G. WEIGHT:

Well, I guess we don't have a deal, Your
Honor.

Page 5, line 1

J. ROBISON:

Well, there was no intention to . . . no
intention to a, steal this truck.

Page 6, line 22

J. ROBISION:

.. . check in existing on an existing debt
and not of obtaining . . . .

Page 7, line 15

G. WEIGHT:

Well, I don't think we have a deal.

Page 9, line 1

JUDGE EYRE:

Do you have questions?

Page 9, line 5

J. ROBISON:

I do.

Page 20, line 11

D. LEAVITT:

Factual basis, this defendant. .. issued a
check or draft a, in exchange for
something of value at a time when the
account upon which it was written was
closed.

Page 20, line 16

J. ROBISON:

That is not a correct statement, Your
Honor.

Quoting direct from Page 21, emphasis added:
JUDGE EYRE:

Okay. You, you did issue a check which
was not honored by your bank. Is that
correct?

J. ROBISON:

That's correct.
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JUDGE EYRE:

And a, upon notice of it not being
honored did you, did you at any time
make that check good?

J. ROBISON:

I attempted to, Your Honor, and my
bonding company also attempted to, but
we were not able to completely do it.

JUDGE EYRE:

Okay. And, a. in exchange for that a car
was delivered. Is that correct? A
vehicle was No. The car was delivered several

J. ROBISON:

weeks prior to that.
JUDGE EYRE:

Well, I mean

J. ROBISON:

There was a vehicle in, a transaction did
involve a vehicle.
Yes. Okay. And that vehicle had a

JUDGE EYRE:

value in excess of $5,000?
J. ROBISON:

It did, Your Honor.

JUDGE EYRE:

The Court finds there's a factual basis
accepts your guilty plea, finds it was
voluntarily and knowingly given with a
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full understanding of your constitutional
rights.
The defendant then entered his guilty plea to the bad check charge.
Defense counsel was allowed to withdraw. However, the defendant, acting pro se,
filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which was denied by the trial court, and he appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has ruled that the defendant's plea was not
voluntarily entered in accordance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and
has further ruled that the factual statement made by the defendant, as set forth in the
above colloquy, sets forth a full defense to the crime charged and thus reversed the trial
court in its Memorandum Decision. The State does not oppose the appellate court's
ruling that there was no compliance with Rule 11 and that, based on such a ruling, the
judgment of the District Court should be vacated, and the defendant allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea, but does contend against the ruling of the appellate court determining that
there was no crime committed in that possession of the vehicle involved was not obtained
by a contemporaneous exchange with the subject check.
ARGUMENT
I -- APPELLATE COURTS HAVE THE DUTY TO REVERSE TRIAL
COURT RULINGS AND JUDGMENTS WHEN THE RECORD ON
APPEAL EXHIBITS JUDICIAL RULINGS DISCLOSING GREAT AND
MANIFEST INJUSTICE.

9

The record clearly revealed to the appellate court that trial court had not followed
the requirements of the law in taking the plea of 'guilty' from the defendant. The record
of the conversation between the trial judge and the defendant regarding the elements of
the offense is clear that the defendant did not admit to the crime charged, nor did he
accept the statement of the crime as given to him by the judge. Thus there was a clear
basis for reversing the judgment of the trial court with regard to a withdraw of the plea of
guilty, but there was also, coupled with that situation, the manifest injustice of the court
applying pressure on the defendant to plead guilty to something he did not do. Further,
that the crime charged had not really occurred. When so confronted, the court has a duty
to act, and the appellate court has so acted. The court has a duty to exercise its discretion
and make determinations "necessary to a proper decision" Kaiserman Assoc. Inc. v .
Francis Town, supra.
Under certain circumstances, the facts of a case may demonstrate and that great
and manifest injustice would be done if the court does not entertain the issue sue sponte
as an exception to the preservation rule. See State v. Pierce. 655 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982).
It should be noted from the facts in the case of State v. Pierce that Pierce attempted to
obtain some advantage by a demonstration before the jury of her placing her foot in a
shoe. There was no objection to the procedure made at the time. However, on appeal, for
the first time counsel for Pierce raised that issue as a violation of her constitutional rights.
Since she had first attempted advantage, there was no showing of great and manifest
10

injustice when the court rejected her argument on appeal. However, the court did note the
prerogative of the appellate court to consider issues sua sponte if there was a need to
correct great and manifest injustice. That is exactly the argument which the
defendant/respondent makes in this case. Also, there is an exception to the opinion in
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). In the present case, an objection was made by
the defendant to Judge Eyre which is clear in the dialogue between the Judge and the
defendant at the time of taking his plea. That conversation disclosed great and manifest
injustice which offended the conscience of the appellate court. Thus the general provision
that a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is barred from asserting
it on appeal should not apply. See State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991).
The court also noted in that opinion that there are two well-established exceptions to that
general rule. They are (1) the trial court committed plain error and (2) there are
exceptional circumstances.
The error of the trial court in this case is plain and comes from the trial court's
own language. Judge Eyre said, "Okay. And, a, in exchange for that a car was
delivered." That is the principle and requirement of the provisions of the bad check law
found in § 76-6-505. However, defendant disagreed with Judge Eyre, stating "No. The
car was delivered several weeks prior to that." Additional conversations occurred, but the
issue of this offense element continued and was never cleared. (R. 398:21) That error is
plain and the error was clearly evident to the appellate court. That error affected the
11

substantial rights of the defendant in two ways; first as to his rights to fully understand the
elements of the crime to which he was entering the guilty plea and, two, that he not be
required to plead guilty to a crime that was not committed.
The court in Archambeau, supra, also noted that the second exception to the rule
allowing consideration of issues for the first time on appeal is a catch-all device based
upon exceptional or unusual circumstances. This case presents exceptional
circumstances. They are unusual. Considering the number of guilty pleas that are
accepted by judges in the state of Utah, we find the entry of one such plea in clear
violation of Rule 11 is exceptional and unusual and constitutes great and manifest
injustice which allows the court to consider this matter.
The appellate court's ruling was made by split decision, but it is clear that the
dissent did not squarely address the facts of the case with regard to the exchange of the
check for the vehicle and failed to recognize that, at the time that the check was delivered,
the vehicle belonged to someone else not a party to the original transaction. It belonged
to a party other than Painter Motor Company and the defendant and it had belonged to
that other party for over two weeks prior to the check being delivered to Painter Motor.
In this case, the trial court's recitation of the elements of the offense and the defendant's
response were clearly called to the court's attention by the defendant's statement that the
vehicle was not obtained in exchange for his check and there was no resolution of that
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issue by the Court. This should have been obvious to the trial court and thus complies
with the plain rule doctrine as set forth in State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989).
It is the court's duty to decide issues necessary to a proper decision, Kaiserman,
supra. The issue of the application and interpretation of the bad check law was plainly
and clearly before the appellate court. It leapt from the pages. It required action and the
appellate court so acted. Clearly the appellate court had the authority to issue its
determination. The next question raised is that determination reasonably supported by the
record in this case? The ruling of the appellate court does not involve it in advocating for
either party, but does involve the appellate court in advocating in support of state law and
thus the plain error doctrine applies, as well as the correction of manifest injustice and the
goal of addressing issues necessary to a proper decision. See Bailey v. Bayles. 2001 UT
App34, 18P.3dll2.
The State complains that the issue of "contemporaneous exchange" as applied to
the bad check law had never been previously raised. However, it was raised specifically
by the trial judge and by the defendant in their dialogue. Furthermore, this question had
to be raised because of the duplicitous conduct of the County Attorney in changing the
plea agreement at the last minute, while the parties were present before the court,
knowing that a substantial amount of effort had been expended in completing and
explaining the written plea statement which contemplated a 'no contest' plea and not a
'guilty' plea. The guilty plea requires admission to the elements of the offense. A 'no
13

contest' plea does not require an admission to those elements, only an admission that the
state has proof to establish the elements. Thus, there is no equity which flows to the state
in this case requiring further notice of the Rule 11 violation and the time and intent
language of the bad check law by the use of "purpose of obtaining..." The State thus
had full notice and opportunity to examine the bad check statute. The defendant's
contention after the plea was taken, as set forth in his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty
plea (R. 252), was that, because of his pressure for the immediate circumstances in having
his plea agreement altered in open court when he was appearing before the Judge, did not
allow him adequate time to consider what was being done and that the trial judge
essentially forced the entry of the plea without the appropriate compliance with Rule 11.
His only request was that he be allowed to withdraw that plea so that the issues of the
innocence or guilt regarding the charge could be appropriately addressed. The defendant
does not wish to deny the state any rights whatever with regard to presenting the issue of
the interpretation of the bad check law. However, on the other hand, he should not have
been denied his rights as clearly set forth in Rule 11- by the pressure to force him to
admit to a contemporaneous exchange.
In fairness to the appellate court, it should be acknowledged that the record
revealed plain error which offends the conscience and constitutes obvious manifest
injustice which the court was obligated to correct in support of Utah's constitutional
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provision providing for due process of law set forth in Article 1, Section 7 of the
Constitution of Utah. Consequently, their decision should be affirmed.
A plain, clear reading of the Utah bad check statute involves the obvious meaning
of the words "the check was issued for the purpose of obtaining". What was to be
obtained in this case? The pickup truck. If you want to obtain something, it means that
you do not have it. In this case, the facts reveal that, at the time the check was delivered,
the defendant did not have the truck, nor did Painter Motor Company. Who had the
truck? The good-faith purchaser. What was the check issued for then? To pay an
existing debt between Painter Motor and the defendant. Nothing can be plainer. It is that
plain, obvious interpretation which motivated the Court of Appeals in issuing their
decision.
II - A SUBSTANTIALLY CONTEMPORANEOUS EXCHANGE IS A
DISPOSITIVE ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF ISSUING A BAD
CHECK
The provisions of Utah's bad check law, as set forth in § 76-6-505, U.C.A.
annotated 1953 as amended, provide: "(1) any person who issues or passes a check . . . .
for the purpose of obtaining, from any person

any . . . . property . . . . knowing it will

not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee is guilty of issuing a bad
check
Clearly the statute raises the question of the motive for the issuing of the check and
the motive must be to commit fraud by using the check as a tool or as an inducement to
15

convince another person to transfer property. Again, the emphasis is again"for the
purpose of obtaining."
Counsel for the State has fully briefed the issue of guidelines for interpreting the
statutes and those cases are adopted by the respondent and thus this court is required, on
this issue, to consider the question of the plain interpretation of the statute.
The respondent represents that a plain interpretation requires that the check be
issued "for the purpose of obtaining" and that the clear meaning of "for the purpose of
obtaining" means that the item, in this case the truck, not possessed by the person issuing
the check, but is still in the possession of the person to receive the check. The check is
the inducement.
The facts of this case disclose that, at the time the check was issued, the truck was
already in the hands of a good-faith purchaser. Its possession had been obtained by the
verbal agreement of the defendant with Painter Motor. It was not in the hands, nor
possessed by the person who received the check. The person who received the check had
already delivered the truck. Thus, at the time the truck was delivered, the relationship
between the defendant and Painter Motor was one of a debtor; the defendant owing a debt
to his creditor, Painter Motor Company, who thus had an open account with the defendant
for the value of the truck. At the time the check was issued, there was no exchange.
The allegations of the petitioner that the respondent has admitted to issuing the
check for the purpose of obtaining property are based upon the flawed arraignment, and
16

are in conflict with the facts in that the defendant has clearly, as set forth in the
conversation between he and the Judge on the date of the entry of the plea. That
conversation revealed that the check was issued for a pre-existing debt and not for the
purpose of obtaining the truck. Further, as the defendant filed his motions to withdraw
his plea, he clearly declared that his appearances before the court, because of the existing
circumstances, were such that he did not clearly understand what was being undertaken.
He was under disclosed pressure and coercion. (R. 398:19)
The bad check statute, in wording, does not say a "substantially contemporaneous"
exchange. However the wording of the statute clearly requires that the check be issued
"for the purpose of obtaining property" which reasonably supposes that the transactions
happen within a reasonable, contemporaneous time period and the check must be the
inducement to the transfer. With regard to a motor vehicle, which is easily moveable and
moved, that time period is a short one as demonstrated by the facts of this case wherein,
at the time of the delivery of the check, the vehicle had again been transferred and was in
the possession of the lawful owner not a party to this action.
Painter's title had no value at the point of receipt of the check; the truck being in
the possession of a lawful owner having acquired the same from the Utah-licensed
automobile dealer. Further, there is no showing in the record that Painter Motor had title
to the vehicle on the date that the check was received, or for that matter on the date the
defendant took possession.
17

With the exception of this case, Utah appellate courts have not ruled by using the
words "contemporaneous exchange," but courts in other states have considered the issue.
In the case of State v. McLean, 44 So.2d 688 (Louisiana 1950), the court ruled in a case
where a check was issued for payment of bananas delivered three days prior to the
issuance of the check:
"If the check is given subsequent to the receipt of the thing the
required exchange does not take place, and no intent to defraud attends the
check's issuance."
And the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of Pollard v. State, 244 So.2d 729
(Miss. 1971), noted that:
"So an essential element of the offense under section 2153 is the
making and delivering of the check to another person for value, and thereby
obtaining from such other person money, goods, or other property of value.
(Emphasis added).
"The one indispensable element of this offense is the receiving of
value for the check at the very time it is delivered. In other words, the seller
parts with something of value on the belief that the check is good at that
particular time...."
Also the Illinois Appellate Court determined, in a case where a post-dated check
was given for the purchase of grain, that the purchaser received the grain, but the check,
deposited four days after receipt, by agreement of the buyer and seller, was not honored.
In overturing the bad check conviction, the court reasoned as follows:
"The giving of a worthless check in payment of a pre-existing debt is
generally held not to be within the ban of the statute, the reasons being that
the party alleged to have been defrauded did not, on the strength of the
18

check, part with anything of value and further the acceptance of a check
does not pay a debt."
In the case of State v. Sinclair. 337 A.2d 703 (Md 1975), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in reserving the conviction of the defendants for issuing a bad check for
services provided in the 30 days prior to the issuing of the check, stated:
"The giving of a worthless check in payment of a pre-existing debt is
generally held not to be within the ban of the statute, the reasons being that
the party alleged to have been defrauded did not, on the strength of the
check, part with anything of value and further the acceptance of a check
does not pay a debt."
We believe the above-cited cases fairly illustrate the rulings of a majority of courts
considering contemporaneous exchange and require a contemporaneous exchange as the
requirement of bad check law involving the issuance of a check for the purpose of
obtaining property.
CONCLUSION
1. The appellate court's ruling that the defendant's guilty plea was improperly
accepted by the trial judge being uncontested should again be affirmed for the purpose of
clarity of the proceedings.
2. The Court of Appeals had a clear duty to consider the facts of this case,
including the taking of the plea and statements made at that time, for the purpose of
determining if, in fact, the defendant had admitted to commission of a crime. He clearly
did not, for he clearly disputed the required elements of issuing a bad check. Property
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that has already passed for a substantial period of time (several weeks) prior to the receipt
of the check demonstrates that the check was not issued for the purpose of obtaining and
the intervention of a third, independent party acquiring the subject property, i.e. the
pickup truck, prior to the issuance of the check; all parties knowing that this would occur,
in the interest of justice requires that the Court of Appeals rule as it did and that this court
sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of October, 2005.

sntmstaw
MILTON T. HARMON'
Cefunsel for the Defendant/Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
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Bates, Assistant Attorney General, at the address of 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt
Lake City, UT 84111 and to Jared W. Eldridge, Juab County Attorney, and by mailing to
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Section
27. [Fundamental rights.]
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE

Article
I.
II.
III.

Declaration of Rights
State Boundaries
Ordinance
Elections and Right of Suffrage
rv. Distribution of Powers
v. Legislative Department
VI.
VII. Executive Department
VIII. Judicial Department
Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
rx.
X. Education
XI. Local Governments
XII. Corporations
XIII. Revenue and Taxation
xrv. Public Debt
XV. Militia
XVI. Labor
XVII. Water Rights
XVIII. Forestry
XIX.. Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
XXI. Salaries
XXII. Miscellaneous
XXIII. Amendment and Revision
XXIV. Schedule

S e c t i o n 1. [ I n h e r e n t a n d i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s . ]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of t h a t
right.
1896
Sec. 2. [All p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n h e r e n t i n t h e p e o p l e . ]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1S96

Sec. 3 . [ U t a h i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e U n i o n . ]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the land.
1896
Sec. 4. [ R e l i g i o u s liberty.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. T h e State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public t r u s t or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
1999

Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
21. [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]

Sec. 5. [ H a b e a s c o r p u s . ]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [ R i g h t t o b e a r a r m s . ]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 7. [ D u e p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses b a i l a b l e . ]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support the new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person

765

887

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

case now pending before the court with undivided loyalty to
t h e defendant;
(c)(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration
have engaged in the active practice of criminal law in the past
five years;
(c)(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys
being considered; and
(c)(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to be appointed will fairly, efficiently and
effectively provide representation to t h e defendant.
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to
death, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to
represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding
t h a t counsel is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be
found proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to
death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys
must meet the following requirements:
(d)(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in
a t least three felony appeals; and
(d)(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past five years an approved continuing legal
education course which deals, in substantial part, with the
trial or appeal of death penalty cases.
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent
an indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to
represent such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on postconviction appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is
qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in postconviction cases. To be found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet t h e following
requirements:
(e)(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have
served as counsel in at least three felony or post-conviction
appeals;
(e)(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have
appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a post-conviction case at
the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation;
(e)(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have
attended and completed or taught within the-past five years
an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in
substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty
cases or with the prosecution or defense of post-conviction
proceedings in death penalty cases;
(e)(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have
tried to judgment or verdict three civil j u r y or felony cases
within the past four years or ten cases total; and
(e)(5) the experience of at least one of t h e appointed attorneys must total not less than five years in the active practice
of law.
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow
the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be
grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal.
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be
paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title 77.
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel
shall be paid p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c).
R u l e 9. R e p e a l e d .
R u l e 9.5. C h a r g e d m u l t i p l e offenses — To b e filed in
single court.
(l)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may
include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as
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defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court t h a t
has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged.
(1Kb) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not be separated except by order of the court and
for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction
over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial entity
shall prosecute the offenses.
R u l e 10. A i i a l g i i l u e n t .
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the
records from the magistrate following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist
of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or
stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him
to plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or
information before he is called upon to plead.
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional
time in which to plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time
may be granted.
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any
proceeding provided for by statute or these rules prior to
arraignment shall be specifically and expressly objected to
before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is waived.
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own
recognizance, prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to
appear for arraignment or trial when required to do so, a
w a r r a n t of arrest may issue and bail may be forfeited.
Rule 11. P l e a s .
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty
by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a
plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent
of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to m a k e
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases
other t h a n felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for
a jury trial.
(e) T h e court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea
until the court h a s found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination,
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and t h a t by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
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(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands th& n a t u r e and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, t h a t upon
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis
is sufficient if it establishes t h a t the charged crime was
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, t h a t the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial
risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory n a t u r e of
the minimum sentence, t h a t may be imposed for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant h a s been advised t h a t the right of
appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting
these factors after the court has established that t h e defendant h a s read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of
the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has
been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, b u t may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears t h a t the prosecuting attorney or any
other party h a s agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of
other charges, t h e agreement shall be approved by t h e court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations a r e allowed by the
court, t h e court shall advise the defendant personally t h a t any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement h a s been reached,
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit t h e disclosure of t h e tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then
indicate to t h e prosecuting attorney and defense counsel
whether t h e proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the j u d g e then decides that final disposition should
not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall
advise t h e defeii(d1uK=*aQd then call upon t h e defendant to
either affirm or w i t h d r a w t h e plea.
(i) With approval o F « i e court and the consent of the
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the
record t h e right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally
ill, in addition to t h e other requirements of this rule, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if
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the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. § 77-16a-103.
ttule 12. Motions.
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or
hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits.
It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is
made and shall set forth t h e relief sought. It may be supported
by affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be
raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(b)(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection shall
be noticed by t h e court a t any time during the pendency of the
proceeding;
(b)(2) motions to suppress evidence;
(b)(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(b)(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or
(b)(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before
trial unless t h e court for good cause orders t h a t the ruling be
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or
objections or to make requests which m u s t be made prior to
trial or a t t h e time set by the court shall constitute waiver
thereof, but t h e court for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver.
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be
made of all proceedings a t the hearing on motions, including
such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the
institution of t h e prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or
information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a s t a t u t e of limitations.
R u l e 13. P r e t r i a l conference.
(a) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a pretrial
conference, with trial counsel present, to consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. The accused
shall be present unless he waives his right to appear.
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pretrial order shall
set out the m a t t e r s ruled upon. Any stipulations made shall be
signed by counsel, approved by the court and filed, and shall
be binding upon the parties at trial, on appeal, and in
postconviction proceedings unless set aside or modified by the
court.
R u l e 14. S u b p o e n a .
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or
interpreter before a court, magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be
issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed,
the prosecuting attorney on his or her own initiative or upon
the direction of the grand jury, or the court in which an
information or indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court
in which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the
defendant, without charge, as many signed subpoenas as the

76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption.
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or
draft's nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that
is less than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third
degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree felony.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JAN 1 3 2005
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20030189-CA

v.
James L. Robison,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
J a n u a r y 1 3 , 2 005)
2 0 0 5 UT App 9

Fourth District, Nephi Department
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr.
Attorneys:

Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thorne.
DAVIS, Judge:
James L. Robison appeals the trial court's denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of issuing a bad
check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003) -1 We reverse.
Robison generally argues that the trial court erred by
failing to comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure when it accepted his guilty plea. Specifically,
Robison asserts that his plea does not constitute an admission of
all of the elements of the offense of issuing a bad check. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. We do not necessarily disagree with
the dissent's conclusion that Robison did not adequately present
this issue either to the trial court or to this court. However,
to avoid a "great and manifest injustice," we will reach this
issue sua sponte as an exception to the preservation rule. State
v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) (stating
that appellate court can reach an issue sua sponte as an
exception to the preservation rule if a "great and manifest

1. Because this statute has not changed since Robison was
charged and convicted, we cite to the most recent version for
convenience.

injustice" would otherwise occur); see also State v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920, 923 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Pierce and
noting parenthetically that "court can entertain an exception sua
sponte if facts reveal 'great and manifest injustice' would
otherwise occur" (quoting Pierce, 655 P.2d at 677)). We agree
with Robison that his conviction is based upon a guilty plea that
does not contain an admission to all the elements of the offense
of issuing a bad check. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. In good
conscience, we cannot affirm Robison's conviction of a crime
that, according to the plea colloquy, he did not commit.
Rule 11 provides, in relevant part, that a trial court may
not accept a defendant's guilty plea until the court has found
that the plea is an admission of all the elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e),
(e)(4)(A). One of the required elements of issuing a bad check
under section 76-6-505 is that the defendant must issue a bad
check "for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm,
partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other thing
of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), (2). We conclude that
this element of section 76-6-505 requires a substantially
contemporaneous exchange.
During Robison's plea colloquy, Robison admitted that he
issued a bad check. However, when the trial court specifically
asked Robison whether it was correct that the vehicle was
delivered to him "in exchange for" the bad check, Robison
replied, "No. The car was delivered several weeks prior "to
[issuance of the bad check] . "2 We conclude that this statement
represents a complete defense to the charge of issuing a bad
check under section 76-6-505, because it establishes that there
was not a substantially contemporaneous exchange--i.e., because
Robison received the vehicle several weeks prior to issuing the
bad check, he did not issue the bad check "for the purpose of
obtaining" the vehicle. Id. The check was irrelevant to the
transaction involving the sale of the vehicle and simply amounted
to payment on an open account. See Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565
P. 2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977) (holding that a bad check issued for
payment on a past due account for goods already received did not
constitute an exchange for property because the payee was "not
induced to give anything of value, nor was it in any way cheated
or adversely affected by the giving of the check").

2. During Robison's plea colloquy, he also characterized his
issuance of the check as payment "on an existing debt."
3. The dissent recognizes this principle from Howells, Inc. v.
Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977), but then proceeds to
(continued...)
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Because Robison's guilty plea was not an admission of all
the elements of the offense of issuing a bad check, see Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-505, we conclude that the trial court erred by
accepting his plea and by denying his subsequent motion to
withdraw his plea. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's
denial of Robison's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand
for a trial.

I CONCUR:

(JU*&&L

>n.

Huc^*j)

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

THORNE, Judge (dissenting):
James Robison pleaded guilty to issuing a bad check and
admitted facts sufficient to establish each element of that
crime. Robison's appellate arguments to the contrary are
inadequately briefed, lack any reasoned analysis or citation to
relevant case law, and shift the burden of research and analysis
to this court. I would reject them on that basis. See Utah R.
3.
(...continued)
rely upon cases from other jurisdictions to support the
proposition that a "short delay" between the receipt of goods and
the issuance of a check may still satisfy the exchange
requirement. We are not persuaded by the dissent's reliance upon
these cases that turn on their unique facts.
The dissent also relies upon State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d
352 (Utah 1986), in which the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a
defendant's conviction for issuing a bad check when the defendant
issued the check one week after receiving stock shares. See id.
at 352, 355. However, Bartholomew does not specifically address
the issue of a substantially contemporaneous exchange, but
instead focuses upon whether a thing of value was received. See
id. at 354-55. We are equally unpersuaded by the dissent's
reliance upon Bartholomew,
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App. P. 24; State v. Sloan. 2003 UT App 170,fl3, 72 P.3d 138.
Further, I see no injustice to Robison in this matter and must
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority opinion concludes that, as a legal matter,
Robison did not admit to a factual basis for the crime of issuing
a bad check because, at his plea hearing, he admitted only to
writing a check "on an existing debt" and that the truck in
question had been delivered "several weeks prior to" the issuance
of the check. Generally speaking, Utah law provides that the
writing of a check on a past due account for goods already
received does not constitute an exchange "for the purpose of
obtaining . . . any money, property, or other thing of value,"
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003), because the payee is "not
induced to give anything of value, nor [is he] in any way cheated
or adversely affected by the giving of the check." Howells, Inc.
v. Nelson. 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977). However, in the
context of Robison's plea hearing, it is clear that Robison 1 s
answers provided the trial court with a factual basis upon which
to accept his guilty plea.
1.

Robison's Factual Admissions at the Plea Hearing

At his plea hearing, Robison never asserted that he had an
open account with his victim, nor did he or his counsel ever
alert the judge to any potential conflict between Robison's
admitted conduct and the statutory language. To the contrary,
Robison admitted in writing at the plea hearing that he was aware
of and understood the "for the purpose of obtaining property"
element of the bad check charge and that there was a factual
basis for that element. Robison waived his right to have the
State prove each element of the offense to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, both in writing and orally on the record.
Based on these and other admissions and waivers, the trial court
accepted Robison1s guilty plea.
The majority opinion relies in part on Robison's assertion
at the plea hearing that his dheck was issued to pay "oi/an
existing debt." Robison 1 s statement to this effect occurred
outside the formal factual basis colloquy and prior to his
decision to plead guilty to a crime, his decision of what crime
to plead to, and his written admission of factual guilt of the
bad check charge. When Robison made the "existing debt" comment,
he still had the right to present inconsistent theories or
defenses.1 The trial court was under no obligation to consider
1. See State v. Mitcheson. 560 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1977)
("[The State's burden of proof] gives the defendant the benefit
(continued...)
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1
such inconsistencies once Robison decidfd to plead guilty to the
bad check charge and proceeded with the formal plea process,
including submitting his formal factual admissions as required by
Rule 11.
At the plea hearing, prior to the trial court's acceptance
of his plea, Robison signed a statement in support of plea. He
adopted this statement on the record. The typed statement had
handwritten corrections to reflect the last-minute change from a
no contest plea to a guilty plea, although some typed references
to a no contest plea remained. Corrected to reflect Robison s
actual plea of guilty, the statement contained the following
admissions:
I have received a copy of the (Amended)
Information against me. I have read it, ° r
had it read to me, and I understand the
nature and the elements of crime(s) to which
I am pleading [guilty] or no contest.
The elements of the crime(s) to which I
am pleading [guilty] are -.
Count I: That I, JAMES L. ROBISON, on
or about September 11, 2001, in Juab
County, State of Utah, did issue a check
for the payment of money for the purEg-Se_
of obtaining- property knowing that it
would not be paid by the drawee and
payment was refused.
I understand that by pleading guilty, I am ^
not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes. I stipulate and agree that if I a-m
pleading guilty, I do not dispute or contest
that the following facts describe my conduct
. . . . These facts provide a basis for the
court to accept my [guilty] plea and prove
the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading [guilty]:
On or about September 11, 2001, in Juab
County, State of Utah, I issued a
check
for the payment of money for the purpiSgjjt
of obtaining property knowing that it
would not be paid by the drawee and
payment was refused.
1.
(...continued)
of every defense thereto which may cause a reasonable doubt to
exist as to his guilt, arising either from the evidence, or lack
of evidence, in the case; and this is true whether___his defenses.
are consistent or not." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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(Emphases added.) The trial court expressly asked Robison if he
had any questions about this written statement, and, except for a
restitution matter, he did not. The court proceeded to question
Robison about his plea decision and, upon satisfying itself that
Robison was acting knowingly and voluntarily, accepted his plea
of guilty.
After accepting the plea, the trial court conducted the
following colloquy to establish its factual basis:
The Judge: Factual basis, Mr. Leavitt?
[Prosecutor] Mr. Leavitt: Your honor,
on the date set forth in the Information this
defendant, James L. Robison, issued a check
or a draft a, in exchange for something of
value at a time when the account upon which
it was written was closed, and the amount
exceeded $5,000.
Defendant: That is not a correct
statement, Your Honor.
The Judge: What is a correct statement,
Mr.-Defendant: Well, I have a letter from
the . . . .
The correct statement is that
account was not closed, the-The Judge: Well-Defendant: --payment was not, was not
honored by the bank but the account was not
closed. I have a letter in my file from the
institution stating that it was open.
The Judge: Okay. You, you did issue a
check which was not honored by your bank. Is
that correct?
Defendant: That's correct.
The Judge: And a, upon notice of it not
being honored did you, did you at any time
make that check good?
Defendant: I attempted to, Your Honor,
and my bonding company also attempted to, but
we were not able to completely do it.
The Judge: Okay. And a, in exchange
fj£\ that a car was delivered. Is that
ssorrect? A vehicle was-(^
Defendant: No. The car was delivered
several weeks prior to that.
The Judge: Well, I mean-Defendant: There was a vehicle in, a
transaction did involve a vehicle.
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The Judge: Yes. Okay. And that
vehicle had a value in excess of $5,000?
Defendant: It did, Your Honor.
Based on this colloquy, the trial court found that there was a
factual basis for Robison' s guilty plea.
«
2.

Robison 1 s Admissions Alone Support His PlVc

There is nothing in Robison's written or oral statements at
the plea hearing, and certainly nothing in the formal factual
colloquy, to establish a factual or legal defense to a bad check
charge. While alleging a short delay between physical delivery
of the truck and his issuance of the check, Robison failed to
allege that the victim was not "cheated or adversely affected by
the giving of the check." Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 5 65 P.2d
1147, 1149 (Utah 1977). As detailed later in this opinion, the
record as a whole reflects that the victim had retained legal
title to the truck and was only induced to provide it to Robison
upon the issuance of the bad check. Even assuming the trial
court could not consider this record evidence for purposes of
accepting Robison's plea, Robison1s failure to deny cheating or
adversely affecting the victim, his admission of a transaction
involving the truck, and his factual admission of his "purpose of
obtaining property" provide more than enough factual basis to
satisfy Rule ll. 2
Even if the sole factor to be considered was the passage of
time, there is no precedent establishing that a delay between
receipt of property and issuance of a check automatically
precludes a bad check conviction. To the contrary, in State v.
Bartholomew, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a bad check
conviction resulting from the issuance of a check one week after
the receipt of stock shares by the defendant. See 724 P.2d 352,
352 (Utah 1986). I see no meaningful distinction between the one
week delay implicitly approved in Bartholomew and the "several

2. Given Robison's written and oral admissions over the course
of the plea hearing, I am also inclined to find that Robison is
estopped from raising the factual basis argument on appeal. The
elements of equitable estoppel are: "(1) an admission, statement
or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2)
action by the other party on the faith of such admission,
statement or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement or act." Department of Human Servs. v.
Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997). Each of these elements
is arguably present in this matter.
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weeks" delay3 asserted by Robison in the fact colloquy. So long
as there is., as Robison admitted/lkt his plea hearing, but a
single "transaction," I do not vffe^Jhe delay in this matter as
falling outside the legislature's intention or the rule set forth
in Howells. See 565 P.2d at 1149. Any distinction that might be
drawn certainly fails to give rise to "great and manifest
injustice" as relied upon by the majority opinion.4

3. The record reveals an actual delay of ten days between
Robison taking physical possession of the truck and his writing a
bad check in payment for it.
4. State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352 (Utah 1986), did not
explicitly address the contemporaneous exchange requirement, but
the failure of the supreme court to identify and address the
issue suggests that it would not find Robison's situation.to be
one of manifest injustice.
Other states addressing this issue have expressly concluded
that a short delay between the receipt of goods and the issuance
of a check may still satisfy the exchange requirement:
Where a worthless check is given as payment
for goods already received, there is no
present consideration, and a conviction for
criminal issuance of a bad check must be
reversed unless "the interval [between
delivery of goods or services and payment
therefor] is slight and the exchange can be
characterized as a single contemporaneous
transaction."
Ledford v. State, 362 S.E.2d 133, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
(emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citations omitted);
see also State v. Piatt, 845 P.2d 815, 817 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that "a worthless check is given for something of value
if the worthless check is issued as part of a contemporaneous
transaction between the parties in which something of value is
exchanged for the check, without regard to whether the thing of
value is delivered before or after the worthless check is
issued"). Ledford addressed a payment by check one day after the
receipt of goods, see 362 S.E.2d at 133-34, while in Piatt the
defendant issued a bad check fourteen days after the receipt of
goods and services. See 845 P.2d at 816. Both cases found their
particular facts sufficient to support a bad check conviction
under a single contemporaneous transaction standard. See also
Gillev v. State, 356 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
contemporaneous transaction where work completed on Friday and
check delivered the following Monday).
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3.

The Record as a Whole Demonstrates Facts Placing Robison's
Actions Squarely Within the Purview of the Bad Check Statute

As stated above, I would hold that Robison's plea has
adequate factual support solely from the facts admitted at the
plea hearing. However, given the majority's decision to examine
Robison's claims under the "great and manifest injustice"
standard, it is appropriate to examine the remainder of the
record to fill in the details of the transaction underlying
Robison's plea. Those details reveal a very different version of
events than those argued by Robison on appeal. And, unlike this
court, the trial court was well aware of the complete context of
Robison's actions from various pretrial pleadings and the incourt testimony of the victim at a prior motion hearing.5
Robison and his victim had never met prior to the truck
transaction, and there were no prior vehicle transactions between
the two. Robison first contacted the victim by phone6 around the
end of July 2001 to request the victim's assistance in selling a
separate vehicle. In mid-August, Robison again spoke with the
victim seeking to locate a suitable truck for a potential buyer.
The victim located the truck through his wholesaler network and
ordered it for Robison.
Robison took physical possession of the truck on approval
for his customer on September 1, 2 0 01. That same day, Robison
informed the victim that his customer was interested in buying
the truck, and the victim agreed to send Robison the title and
paperwork7 once Robison provided a check. On September 11, the
victim contacted Robison about payment, and Robision agreed to
send the victim a check, which he did. The victim only sent,
i.e., was "induced to give," Robison title to the truck after

5. The contextual facts recited in this section of the opinion
are taken from pleadings and exhibits filed in this action,
seeking to determine proper possession of the truck as between
competing third party claimants.' kt the hearing on this dispute,
the victim in this matter gave extensive testimony about the
facts, circumstances, and timingXofc the truck transaction.
6. The victim testified that he spoke with Robison four or five
times on the phone prior to September 1, 2001.
7. Exhibits to prior pleadings demonstrate that title to the
truck was not even issued to the victim, and thus could not have
been transferred to Robison, until September 5, 2001. Similarly,
the sales contract contemplated a cash sale of the truck to
Robison on September 11 for $40,812.
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Robison issued a bad check in payment.
1149.

Howells, 565 P.2d at

These supporting facts strongly suggest that Robison's
issuance of a bad check was not merely substantially but actually
in exchange for title to, rather than mere physical possession
of, the truck. If Robison believed that these or other facts
conflicted with the legal elements of a bad check charge, he
should have expressly raised the issue at the trial court level.
Had he done so, the facts could have been sifted and justice
assured. Doing this type of analysis at the appellate level,
without the benefit of trial court 'fact sifting,' is
problematic.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, even assuming that the relevant time
period is the ten-day delay between Robison's initial physical
receipt of the truck and his issuance of a bad check, I would
affirm the trial court. Under my reading of Utah law, the court
was justified in accepting Robison's plea solely based on his
admissions that he had issued a check that had not been honored,
that the check was issued in a transaction involving the recent
receipt of a truck, and that the truck had a value in excess of
$5,000. The record further indicates that Robison issued the
check prior to and in exchange for the title and other paperwork
that established legal transfer of ownership of the truck to
Robison.
I see no injustice, great or otherwise, in holding Robison
to his guilty plea and would accordingly affirm the trial court's
denial of Robison's motion to withdraw.
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